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Abstract 
We study the impact of reductions in interchange fees on payment card services. We find that 
consumer and merchant acceptance and transaction volumes increased when interchange fees 
were reduced. Our results suggest that a 10 percent reduction in the rate of decline per quarter in 
the average interchange fee by an acquirer resulted in a rate of increase in merchant acceptance 
per quarter of up to 1.4 percent. Additionally, a 10 percent increase in the rate of interaction of 
merchant acceptance and the total number of cards increased the rate of quarterly issuer 
transaction volumes up to 1.7 percent.  
Key words: consumer choice, merchant adoption, payment cards 
JEL Codes: L11, G21, D53 
 
 
Carbó Valverde can be reached at s.carbo-valverde@bangor.ac.uk, Chakravorti can be reached at 
bobchakravorti@gmail.com and Rodriguez Fernandez can be reached at franrod@ugr.es. We 
thank Philippe Aghion, the editor, Mary Burke, Sarah Draus, Christopher Foote, Fabiá Gumbau, 
Charlie Kahn, Beth Kiser, Mark Manuszak, Dave Mills, Hector Pérez, Rich Rosen, Scott Schuh, 
	
				


502
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
 1
Joanna Stavins, Marianne Verdier, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the Federal 
Reserve Banks of Boston and Chicago, the Federal Reserve Board, the Retail Payments: 
Integration & Innovation conference held at the European Central Bank, the 2009 European 
Economic Association Meetings, and the 2010 Conference on Platform Markets - Regulation and 
Competition Policy held at ZEW-University of Mannheim for their comments. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago or the Federal Reserve System. Santiago Carbó Valverde and Francisco Rodríguez 
Fernández acknowledge financial support from projects MICIN-FEDER ECO2011-27954 and 
Junta de Andalucía P12.SEJ.2463. 
 
1. Introduction 
Payment networks are the backbone of any well-functioning financial market. Specifically, 
retail payment networks allow buyers of products and services to transfer monetary value to 
sellers. Increasingly, these monetary transfers are initiated with payment cards. Payment cards 
are generally characterized as a two-sided market. Rochet and Tirole (2006b) define a two-sided 
market when the price structure, or the share that each type of end-user pays the platform, affects 
the total volume of transactions.1 The key aspect of these markets is the presence of indirect 
network externalities and how fee structures are able to internalize these externalities. Often 
platforms will subsidize the participation of one type of end-user by extracting surplus from 
another type of end-user to internalize this externality. 
                                                 
1
 For a broader description of two-sided markets, see Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole 
(2006b), Rysman (2009), and Weyl (2010). 
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 2
Payment card networks are comprised of consumers (one type of end-user), their financial 
institutions (known as issuers), merchants (the other type of end-user), their financial institutions 
(known as acquirers) and a network operator or platform. A consumer makes a purchase from a 
merchant. Generally, the merchant charges the same price regardless of the type of payment 
instrument used to make the purchase. Consumers often pay annual membership fees to their 
financial institutions for credit cards and may pay service charges for a bundle of services 
associated with transactions accounts including debit card services. Merchants pay fees known as 
merchant discounts. Acquirers pay interchange fees to issuers.   
The level of interchange fees continues to receive attention around the world by public 
authorities. A small, but controversial section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by the President in 
2010 gives the Federal Reserve the authority to regulate U.S. debit card interchange fees to 
promote a more efficient retail payment system. The Reserve Bank of Australia regulated 
interchange fees in 2002 after concluding that consumers did not face the correct incentives to 
use the most efficient payment instrument. The European Commission in 2007 ruled that 
MasterCard’s interchange fees violated the EU’s antitrust laws. Additionally, the European 
General Court judgment of May 20122 confirmed the Commission's finding in its MasterCard 
                                                 
2
 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on 
payment services in the internal market (the so called 'Payment Services Directive' or PSD) is 
currently being complemented with proposals (under discussion) such as the “Proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on interchange fees for card-based 
payment transactions” (SWD(2013)288).  
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 3
Decision of December 2007.3 Alternatively, the reduction in interchange fees may also occur 
without regulatory intervention as occurred in the United States when card networks convinced 
large department stores and grocery stores to accept payment cards by reducing interchange fees 
which resulted in lower merchant fees.  
 The economic theory regarding interchange fees predicts that by lowering the optimal 
interchange fees some merchants not currently accepting card payments may start to accept 
them. However, lowering interchange fees would increase cardholder fees and, consequently, 
some of them may abandon their payment cards or use them less frequently. However, changes 
in external factors such as greater awareness of the benefits of payment cards or reductions in 
processing and credit intermediation costs may result in greater adoption and usage by 
consumers even when consumer fees increase resulting from interchange fees being lowered by 
the card network or by government mandate. 
Using a unique Spanish proprietary bank-level dataset, we are able to study the impact of 
interchange fee reductions from 1997 to 2007 on merchant acceptance, consumer adoption, 
payment card transaction volumes, and issuer and acquirer revenues. Our main results are as 
follows. First, we find strong evidence suggesting that merchant acceptance has increased 
because of a reduction in interchange fees. Second, consumer adoption of debit cards did not 
significantly decrease over the period because of lower interchange fee as would be predicted by 
theoretical models absent changes in external factors. Credit card adoption increased 
dramatically during the period of interchange fee reductions suggesting the value proposition for 
those consumers previously not having credit cards improved despite higher fees. Third, most 
                                                 
3
 See Evans (2011) and Weiner and Wright (2005) for more details on regulatory interventions in 
other countries. 
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 4
importantly, reductions in interchange fees resulted in a dramatic increase in payment card 
transactions during this period. Fourth, bank payment revenues from debit and credit card 
services increased as a result of lower interchange fees. Our results for bank revenues suggest 
that the increase in the number of transactions appears to offset the decrease in the per-
transaction bank revenue.  
Our article is organized in the following way. In the next section, we survey the main 
theoretical and empirical studies on interchange fees. Section 3 analyses the industry and the 
data. We discuss our empirical strategy in section 4. In section 5, we present our results. Finally, 
we offer some concluding remarks in section 6.  
 
 
 
2. Payment card markets and interchange fees: literature background 
The theoretical literature on payment cards along with the broader two-sided market 
literature stresses the balancing of two different types of end users. In the case of payment card 
services, the two types of end-users are consumers and merchants. When markets are 
competitive, the optimal level of total fees (the sum of consumer and merchant fees) occurs when 
the sum of benefits of consumers and merchants is equal to the sum of the costs to consumers 
and merchants. However, the price structure or the proportion of the total fee paid by each type 
of end user matters. Baxter (1983) concluded that a side payment from one type of end user to 
the other type of end user might be required to reach the optimal level of payment card usage. 
Thus, while a decrease in interchange fees may result in greater merchant adoption, the increase 
in price to consumers may result in a decrease in consumer adoption and usage. In this article, 
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 5
we test if consumers decreased their adoption and usage of payment cards when the cost of 
payment services increased even when the number of accepting merchants increased. 
The implementation of this side payment between merchants and consumers occurs through 
the interchange fee. If the interchange fee decreases, the cost to consumers will increase and the 
cost to merchants will decrease. The impact on adoption and usage by consumers and merchants 
is dependent on demand elasticities of each end-user type. Furthermore, a critical component of 
each type of end-user’s demand is critically dependent on the level of adoption by the other type 
of end-user. Consumers will not adopt and use payment cards unless there is a sufficient number 
of merchants accepting cards. Like consumers, merchants will not accept cards unless there is 
sufficient number of consumers on the other side that adopt and use payment cards. Hence, there 
is a level of interchange fees that ensures that the optimal level of payment card adoption and 
usage occurs. If the interchange fee is lowered from the optimal one, consumers will decrease 
their usage and adoption and if it is raised merchants will decrease their acceptance or be 
reluctant to actually accept them even if they advertise that they will.4  
Since Baxter’s initial study, researchers have extended this analysis in various directions. 
Schmalensee (2002) considers issuers and acquirers with market power but still finds a similar 
role for interchange fees. Rochet and Tirole (2002) consider strategic reasons for merchants to 
accept payment cards such as business stealing from other merchants and finds that the socially 
optimal interchange fee may be lower than the fee set by banks.5 For the most part, the 
theoretical literature does not consider changes to the price level. An exception is Chakravorti 
                                                 
4
 Rochet and Tirole (2011) call this the tourist test. 
5
 For a review of this literature see Bolt and Chakravorti (2008b), Evans (2011) and Evans and 
Matheus (2011). 
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 6
and Roson (2006), who consider the effects of competition on price level and price structure. In 
particular, they consider three types of market structures for payment networks: cartel, non-
cooperative duopoly under product differentiation, and Bertrand duopoly (price competition for 
homogeneous products). They find that competition unambiguously improves consumer and 
merchant welfare while reducing the profits of payment networks. 
However, the theoretical literature solves a static problem without consideration to potential 
exogenous environmental changes such as lower technology costs and increased awareness by 
consumers and merchants of the benefits along with the benefits of scale and scope economies 
that may further drive costs lower with increased payment volumes. These environmental 
changes and scale and scope economies are likely to affect the price level along with the price 
structure. During the ten-year period that we study, there were likely improvements to 
technology that may have reduced payment-processing costs and increased awareness of card 
benefits that may have also increased perceived consumer benefits of card adoption and usage.  
Unfortunately, empirical research on the impact of changes in interchange fees on usage is 
limited. Hayes (2007) uses structural break analysis to study the impact of interchange fee 
regulation in Australia. An important difference between Australia and Spain is that in Australia, 
the authorities regulated interchange fees to reduce the incentive to use credit cards instead of 
debit cards. Hayes uses aggregate level monthly data and looks at the changes in interchange fees 
on the share of credit card purchases of all payment purchases. Given the maturity of the 
Australian market, he finds no evidence of structural breaks resulting from an almost 50 percent 
mandated decrease in interchange fees. While the change in interchange fees may not have 
affected long-run trend of credit card usage, the distribution of economic surplus among agents 
may have shifted. 
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 7
Chang et al. (2005) explore the impact of interchange fee reduction in Australia. They use 
quarterly level data from Visa Australia to calculate loss in interchange income per card. Most of 
their analysis is based on descriptive comparative statistics based on annual aggregate data, and 
their main econometric analysis focuses on how the decreasing trend in interchange fees 
accelerated as a consequence of anticipation to the regulatory changes. Their descriptive analysis 
shows that while merchants benefited from interchange fee reductions, merchants did not pass-
on these benefits to consumers.  
Rysman (2007) studies the interaction of consumer usage and merchant acceptance in the 
context where consumers hold more than one credit card. He finds correlation between consumer 
usage and merchant acceptance at the network level, which suggests the existence of a positive 
feedback loop between consumer usage and merchant acceptance consistent with our results. 
There are some empirical investigations of other two-sided markets (Argentesi and 
Filistucchi, 2007; Dubois, Hernandez-Perez, and Ivaldi, 2007; Kaiser and Wright, 2006; and 
Rysman, 2004). Our approach is similar to Rysman (2004) who uses a simultaneous equation 
estimation technique to study the tradeoffs between consumers and advertisers in the market for 
yellow pages. He estimates the consumer demand for yellow page usage as a function of 
advertising and the inverse demand for advertising as a function of consumer usage. He is able to 
identify a positive network effect.   
  
3. The industry and the data 
Spain provides for an unique natural experiment to study the effects of reductions in 
interchange fees on consumer and merchant payment card adoption and usage. Very few 
countries have experienced such a rapid reduction of interchange fees over a short-time frame 
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 8
resulting in significant changes in acceptance, adoption and usage. In 2000, Spanish residents 
relied more on cash to make purchases than their neighboring countries. Carbó Valverde et al. 
(2003) report that Spain had a currency to GDP ratio of 8.9 percent compared to 6.2 percent for 
Germany, 4.7 percent for Portugal, and 3.2 percent for France.  
One strategy to increase merchant acceptance of payment cards is to reduce interchange 
fees. However, whether greater merchant acceptance increases card adoption by consumers or 
payment card transactions, generally, is an empirical question that we address in this paper. 
There were four important events that significantly affected the setting of interchange fees in the 
Spanish payment card industry since the late 1990s.6  From an empirical perspective, estimating 
                                                 
6
 The first regulatory decision on interchange fees took place in May 1999. The Spanish 
government promoted an agreement between the three payment networks and the main merchant 
associations to reduce maximum multilateral interchange fees to 2.75 percent in July 2002 from 
maximum interchange fees of 3.5 percent. From July 2002 to January 2003, the maximum 
interchange fee in Spain was reduced from 2.75 percent to 1.85 percent. In May 2003, the 
Spanish Congress requested the TDC to investigate the setting of interchange fees and to follow 
the basic principles that the European Commission adopted for EU-wide cross-border 
interchange fees. The TDC refused several proposals from the networks regarding their setting of 
interchange fees. The maximum interchange fee was progressively reduced from 1.85 percent in 
January 2003 to 1.75 percent in December 2005. The most important regulatory action for the 
Spanish payment card industry took place in December 2005 when the Spanish government 
promoted an agreement between payment networks and merchant associations to establish a 
timetable to progressively reduce interchange fees from 2005 to 2009, with different schedules 
for debit and credit cards. Average debit card interchange fee declined from 0.39 to 0.31 
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 9
the impact that such events could have had on the level of interchange fees is difficult because it 
is not possible to identify a precise date for each intervention—most of them took place over a 
long time period and did not have an immediate and clearly identifiable effect on fees. In 
addition, the interventions had short-term and long-term effects that interact with other 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. In our empirical analysis, we control for the effects 
of such events although we acknowledge that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of mandatory 
reductions in fees from industry trends. Therefore, we focus on the effects of the reductions 
themselves regardless of their origin.  
 
The Data 
                                                                                                                                                             
euros/transaction from 2005 to 2009 while the average credit card interchange fee fell from 1.23 
to 0.67 percent. 
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 10
We use proprietary quarterly payment card data from 45 Spanish banks from 1997:1 to 
2007:4. These data are adjusted to reflect mergers during our sample period to create a balanced 
panel by backward aggregating all premerger data on merging banks prior to their merger. In 
total, there are 1,980 panel observations.7 The database contains quarterly bank-level (acquirer 
and issuer) information on payment cards, ATMs and POS terminals as well as fees for debit 
(interchange and merchant fees) and credit card transactions (interchange fees, merchant fees and 
annual credit card fees). Our data also includes merchant acceptance and transaction volume by 
acquirer and number of cardholders and transaction volume by issuer. Our data allow us to test, 
for the first time, some of the fundamental predictions of the two-sided market theoretical 
payment card models regarding the impact of interchange fee reductions on payment card 
adoption and usage. 
 
Adoption and usage: main figures 
During 1997-2007, debit card transactions increased from 156 million to 863 million and 
credit card transactions increased from 138 million to 1.037 billion, according to the Bank of 
Spain data. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of some of the main variables from 1997 to 2007 from 
our proprietary dataset. Interchange and merchant fees are highly correlated (simple correlation 
is .94). Besides, the evolution of these fees seems to be asymmetrically related to the evolution 
of annual fees. Although credit card annual fees increase over time, merchant acceptance—
percentage of merchants accepting cards—grows over the whole period.  Overall, the number of 
POS and cards and related transaction volumes also increase significantly. From 1997 to 2007, 
                                                 
7
 Banks in our sample represented 56.7 percent of total card payment transactions in 1997 and 
64.8 percent in 2007 when compared to the Bank of Spain aggregate data. 
	
				


502
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
 11
the number of debit cards increased by 40.9 percent, while the number of credit cards increased 
by 207.1 percent. Furthermore, the average number of POS transactions per card per year 
increased from 7.1 to 27.8 during the same period.  
Consumer preferences for debit and credit cards differ. Adoption for debit cards by 
consumers reached a saturation point earlier than credit cards because they were adopted for their 
ATM functionality more than a decade before. In particular, as also shown in Figure 1, the 
number of debit cards reached its peak in 2006 (33.1 million) and decreased to 31.5 million in 
2007.It is important to note that the number of credit cards increased monotonically during the 
period, reaching 43 million in 2007, according to the Bank of Spain. Spanish consumers 
increased their holdings of credit cards even though credit card annual fees increased. According 
to our sample data, average credit card annual fees increased from 18.53 euros in December 
1997 to 28.16 euros in December 2007. We also observe that interchange fees decreased on 
average from 3.42 percent in 1997 to 0.90 percent in 2007. 
 
Definition of the variables 
Table 1 provides the main definitions of the posited explanatory variables and their scope 
(bank-level, network-level and dummy variables). Banks in our sample belong to two of the 
three Spanish networks, Euro6000 and Servired.8 The distinction between bank-level and 
network-level variables is important for our empirical purposes. For example, a consumer’s 
decision to adopt an issuer’s payment card is dependent on the total number of merchants that 
accept the payment cards. Similarly, a merchant’s acceptance of debit cards is dependent on the 
                                                 
8
 Cardholders belong to only one payment network. However, there are some merchants that 
belong to more than one of these three networks. 
	
				


502
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
 12
total number of cardholders that have debit cards. From the data, we observe that most of the 
issuers and acquirers operate in different regions. We capture the regional effects in various 
ways. Merchant acceptance by acquirer has been computed as a branch-weighted average of 
merchant acceptance in the different regions where the acquirer operates. Similarly, the variable 
for merchant acceptance at the market level has been computed as a branch-weighted average of 
the percentage of merchants accepting cards for purchase transactions in the regions where the 
bank or any other banks belonging to the same network operate over the total number of 
merchants in those regions.  
 Additionally, although the maximum and minimum thresholds of interchange fees for 
different merchant activities is set at the network level, the average acquirer-level merchant fee 
varies depending on the actual fee charged and the proportion of the bank’s POS debit and credit 
transactions by merchant sector. Therefore, the merchant discount fee charged by an acquirer is 
computed as a transaction weighted-average of merchant discount fees charged by the bank in 
the different merchant sectors using the acquirer’s POS machines.  
Our data also permits us to consider some non-monetary costs that may affect decisions 
regarding adoption and usage by consumers and merchants. In particular, there are non-monetary 
costs that affect the adoption of a card such as the ‘shoe leather’ costs involved in the distance to 
reach a cardholder’s bank branches to withdraw cash, the main alternative to payment cards. We 
will use population density as a proxy for the availability of payments infrastructure.  
When a consumer chooses to use a payment card, the density of ATMs from other issuers 
affects her decision to use a debit card. To capture the opportunity cost of using a debit card, we 
compute a rival ATM density variable as a proxy of the relative costs of withdrawing cash at 
rivals’ ATMs.   
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 13
We also consider other variables such as region-specific control variables that may influence 
card transactions. For example, our crime data is region specific and measures robberies and 
assaults per 1,000 residents in a given region. If the acquirer or issuer operates in more than one 
region, we use a weighted average by the number of bank branches in the region.  
The summary statistics for the variables that we use for our empirical model are shown in 
Table 2. Over the sample period, the average percentage of merchants accepting debit cards of 
merchant banks in the regions where these banks have branches is 55.36% as compared to 
57.23% in the case of credit cards. At a network level (including all banks integrating the 
networks) the average acceptance is a bit higher (58.02% for debit cards and 59.37% for credit 
cards). As for prices, in line with the trends shown in Figure 1, average merchant discount fees 
are found to be larger for credit cards (2.03%) than for debit cards (1.36%). Similarly, average 
credit card interchange fees (1.96%) are larger than debit card interchange fees (1.24%).  
Along with the trends in prices and transactions shown in Figure 1, Table 2 shows some 
interesting features related to the market size and infrastructure. In particular each bank has 
480,000 debit cards and 550,000 credit cards issued on average over the sample period. The 
average number of POS transactions is 11.14 million for debit cards and 12.28 million for credit 
cards. Additionally, rivals’ ATM density is 0.9 ATMs per squared kilometer for a population 
density of 83.3 inhabitants per squared kilometer.  
  
4.  Empirical Strategy  
Our empirical analysis will focus on how decreasing interchange fees affected merchant and 
consumer adoption of payment cards as well as issuer and acquirer transaction volumes and 
revenues. We will compare the impact of lowering interchange fees on two types of payment 
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cards—debit and credit. In our empirical analysis, an issuer or an acquirer is our unit of study. In 
other words, we will study the impact of lowering interchange fees on an acquirer’s changes in 
merchant acceptance in the region that it operates in and its transaction volume and an issuer’s 
changes in its number of cardholders and its transaction volume. 
 
Merchant acceptance and consumer adoption  
Lowering interchange fees is likely to increase merchant acceptance of payment cards 
because some merchants previously not accepting payment cards would choose to accept 
payment cards at a lower fee. In addition to the level of fees, merchants also consider consumer 
adoption in their acceptance decisions. 
On the other hand, lowering interchange fees is likely to increase cardholder annual fees.9 
The level of increase in consumer debit card fees is difficult to measure because of the bundle of 
services offered with a transaction account or a line of credit. Unlike debit cards, credit cards 
have explicit annual fees. Facing higher fees, some cardholders may abandon their payment 
cards. But, if the increase in fees is associated with greater merchant acceptance, cardholders 
may value credit cards more and continue to hold them or new consumers may adopt them even 
if fees increase. Alternatively, if the demand for payment cards is sufficiently inelastic, 
consumers may continue to hold their payment cards Our empirical analysis is unable to 
distinguish between these two explanations. However, the addition of new cardholders as 
                                                 
9
 Furthermore, consumers may face higher costs other than annual fees from their financial 
institutions that we are unable to capture such as reduction in frequent-use rewards or higher 
interest rates on credit card debt. 
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evidenced by greater card adoption would be due to additional benefits associated with the cards 
such as increased merchant acceptance.   
We estimate equations (1) and (2) that identify merchant acceptance and consumer adoption 
decisions: 
Merchant acceptance = f (
 
Xma ,C)  (1) 
Consumer adoption = f (
 
Xca ,C)  (2) 
where Xma  and Xca are the exclusion restrictions that identify the merchant acceptance and 
consumer adoption decisions, respectively, and C is the vector of control variables which is 
common to both equations. All control variables are expressed as the difference between the 
logarithms of current quarter and the quarter before.10 These differences can be interpreted as 
quarterly growth rates.  
We study the impact of interchange fees separately for debit and credit cards. For merchants, 
they face an explicit per-transaction fee, the merchant discount fee, to process either a debit or 
credit card transaction that is strongly correlated with the interchange fee. Merchant debit and 
credit card acceptance exclusion restrictions include the merchant discount fee and the number of 
cards in the network by type of payment card. Consumer debit card exclusion restrictions are 
population density and lagged merchant acceptance. For credit cards, the consumer exclusion 
restrictions are credit card annual fees and one-period lagged merchant acceptance. 
                                                 
10
 Our assumption is that consumer and merchant adoption decisions are not immediately 
observed. If we use two lags or four lags instead of one lag, the results are very similar but 
quantitatively higher (which would be predicted as they are capturing the effects for a longer 
time period). The one-lagged approach is similar to other empirical models dealing with payment 
price structure and network effects such as Kaiser and Wright (2006) and Rysman (2007).   
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There are some key differences in how issuers charge their customers for debit and credit 
cards. Cardholders do not generally pay a fixed or per-transaction fee for their debit cards. The 
pricing for debit card services is often bundled with other banking services such as access to 
ATMs. Thus, to isolate a fee for debit card services separately is not possible. Instead, we use an 
instrument to proxy for debit card benefits. The instrument that we use is population density. 
When population density is high, consumers are more likely to have a debit card because the 
availability of merchant acceptance terminals and ATMs is higher. Higher population density 
would most likely positively affect the adoption of ATM and debit cards.  
In addition, there is the indirect network effect— as merchant acceptance increases, the value 
of having a debit card increases. If the direct marginal cost of holding a debit card is close to 
zero, we would expect an increase in debit card issuance as the proportion of merchants that 
accept debit cards increases. Eventually, debit cards may reach a saturation point i.e. when most 
residents already have adopted ATM/debit cards. Merchant acceptance enters the cardholder 
adoption decision as a lagged explanatory factor. The logic behind this specification is that 
merchant acceptance and fees may be contemporaneously related while transactions, issuance 
and usage may be determined by observed previous acceptance.  
Unlike debit cards, credit cards are stand-alone products that usually have explicit fees. 
Reductions in credit card interchange fee revenue should result in higher annual fees for 
cardholders to offset lost issuer interchange revenue as predicted by the two-sided market 
literature. As mentioned before, credit card annual fees have indeed increased in Spain during 
our sample period.  
Our control variables for all regressions are acquirer and issuer size, the crime rate, and a 
time trend. Given that payment processing is a scale business, we take bank size (the log of 
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bank’s total assets) to control for any increase in bank size during the sample period. We use 
crime statistics to capture the effect of crime on the decisions of merchants and consumers to 
accept payment cards.11 We would expect that as crime increases, the adoption of payment cards 
to increase because payment cards are more secure than cash in the event they are stolen or lost. 
In order to control the (mainly upward) trend in the data for merchant acceptance, number of 
cards and number of transactions, we use a GDP growth.  
 
Acquirer and issuer transaction volume 
Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to study transaction per card or per merchant. 
Instead, we have transaction volume data by acquirer and issuer. However, changes in acquirer 
and issuer transaction volume are ideal instruments to study the impact of changes in payment 
card usage resulting from changes in the interchange fee. Our dependent variables for usage are 
average quarterly transactions per POS terminal by acquirers and average quarterly transactions 
by card by issuers separated into debit and credit card transactions.   
Unlike adoption and acceptance decisions, we estimate acquirer and issuer transaction 
volumes separately. Given that our units of study are acquirers and issuers, estimating the 
volumes separately is appropriate for transaction volumes. In other words, the number of issuers 
does not impact the acquirers’ volumes and vice versa. Our regressions for debit and credit card 
issuer and transaction volumes are:  
Acquirer transaction volume = f (
 
Xatv ,C)  (3) 
Issuer transaction volume = f (
 
Xitv ,C)  (4) 
                                                 
11
 Some theoretical money models suggest that crime may motivate the substitution of cash by 
more secure payment alternatives (He, Huang, and Wright, 2005).     
	
				


502
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
 18
where Xatv  and Xitv are the exclusion restrictions that identify the acquirer transaction volume  
and the issuer transaction volume equations, respectively, and vector C is the same as in 
equations (1) and (2).  
For acquirer transaction volume, we use an acquirer’s quarterly transactions per POS 
terminal as our dependent variable. The exclusion restriction that identifies the acquirer 
transaction volume is an interaction term of its merchant acceptance and the total number of 
debit or credit cards in that network. The probability of a transaction on an acquirer’s terminal 
increases when the number of merchants served by the acquirer increases or the number of total 
debit or credit cards increases.   
Next, we analyze what factors affect issuer transaction volume. The dependent variable is the 
number of transactions per issuer per card. The key explanatory variable is an interaction term of 
the merchant acceptance in the network and the number of cards issued by the bank. We include 
the same control, except for own rival ATM density for debit cards instead of population density. 
The use of density of rival ATMs in the transaction volume equation seems to be particularly 
useful as a proxy for the benefit of using debit cards as it capture the usage costs. Given that 
ATM owners impose surcharges for cards issued by competitor banks’ ATMs, as the likelihood 
of using one of these ATMs increases, the benefit to having a debit card increases.  
 
Identifying issuer and acquirer revenues 
Unfortunately, we are unable to measure acquirer and issuer profits directly, but we are able 
to study the impact of changes in interchange fees on bank revenue. As we have discussed in the 
data section, average total issuer and acquirer revenues have increased during our sample period 
despite reductions in interchange fees. The loss in per-transaction revenue may be made up by a 
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greater number of transactions. If costs remain constant or grow slower than revenues, acquirer 
or issuer profit may increase with increasing revenue. Given large economies of scale and scope, 
one might expect that costs would not grow as fast as revenues.  
As before, we separate banks into issuers and acquirers for debit and credit cards. Our 
dependent variables are issuer and acquirer payment card revenue by type of card. For issuers, 
this would be the product of the average interchange fees and the number of transactions along 
with total annual fees collected (only for credit cards). For debit cards, we only use interchange 
fee revenue. For acquirers, this would be the difference between the merchant discount charged 
and the interchange fee paid multiplied by the number of transactions. Similar to our transaction 
volume regressions, our explanatory variable for acquirers is one-quarter lag of the interaction of 
merchant acceptance of a specific acquirer and the total number of cards in the network. Our 
exclusion restriction for issuers is the number of cards issued by each issuer the quarter before 
times the proportion of merchants accepting in the whole network. Our exclusion restriction for 
acquirers is the proportion of merchant acceptance of debit and credit cards, respectively, times 
the number of debit and credit cards, respectively, in the network.  
 
GMM approach and endogeneity issues 
The identification of equations (1) and (2) and of issuer and acquirer revenues has potential 
cross-equation restrictions as well as endogeneity concerns that need specific treatment.   
As for cross-equation restrictions, the error terms for consumer adoption and merchant 
acceptance are assumed to be correlated across the equations. This correlation implies that even 
if a separate equation-by-equation estimation would be consistent, it would not be as efficient as 
the simultaneous equation method. Since our model specification allows acceptance and 
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adoption variables to interact with variables related to number of transactions this may create 
non-linear cross-equation restrictions on the specified parameters. In order to deal with these 
restrictions, the simultaneous equations are estimated using a General Method of Moments 
(GMM) routine with acquirer and issuer specific fixed effects (Hansen, 1982; Wooldrige, 2002). 
As for the endogeneity concerns, although it is not possible to eliminate all sources of 
potential endogeneity completely, we introduce several instruments to try to reduce these 
potential effects. The main endogeneity concern refers to the (classical) problem of relating 
prices to quantities in the demand equations. In particular, the level of interchange fees may be a 
result of the optimal choice by payment networks, possibly to changes in demand conditions on 
the two sides of the market. For example cardholders’ willingness to pay might increase and this 
would enable the platform to charge higher cardholders’ fees and lower merchant fees, thereby 
lowering interchange fees. If this is the case, merchants’ fees are potentially endogenous in 
equation (1).  
In order to solve this problem, we instrument the fees and correct a major portion of that 
potential endogeneity bias. A first assumption is that the costs associated with bank-specific 
efficiency levels partially drive prices charged to merchants and cardholders, but they are 
uncorrelated with the error terms of the demand equations. Therefore, we can use the 
cost/income ratio (operating costs/net income) as instrument for cardholder fees. Similarly, we 
consider the regional market share of deposits of the acquirer bank as instrument for merchant 
fees. The idea is that a bank may build an ongoing relationship with a merchant due, for 
example, to long-standing relationships or cross-selling of products. These contractual 
relationships may affect fees charged to these merchants, but they are uncorrelated with the 
demand equations. Following the same logic, we also specify some instruments for the variables 
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at the network level. The natural logarithm of the growth in loans and deposits managed by that 
network is included as an instrument for the network level present.12  
We use both current and lagged values of all the instruments. The appropriateness of the 
instruments is also checked by using a standard test for orthogonality of the instruments with the 
residuals. The null hypothesis of the orthogonality of the instruments cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent level in all cases. The standard test of overidentifying restrictions is also reported in the 
tables. 
We cluster standard errors at the bank level, as suggested by Petersen (2009). We also 
introduce bank fixed effects and time dummies. Additionally, we also use dummies to control for 
the regulatory events that took place over the sample period even if, as discussed above, it is not 
possible to clearly identify such potential effect. Importantly, our results do not change 
significantly—neither in the signs of the coefficients nor in their magnitude—when these 
regulation dummies are present.  
 
5.  Main Results  
The main results of our analysis are shown in Tables 3 to 7. We also discuss some robustness 
tests on the results in the Appendix. 
 
Debit and Credit Card Adoption 
Table 3 shows the results corresponding to consumers and merchant adoption of debit cards. 
We find that a 10 percent reduction in the rate of decline per quarter in the average interchange 
                                                 
12
 Our instrumental variable approach is similar to the one of Berry et al. (1995), Kaiser and 
Wright (2006) and Rysman (2007). 
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fee by an acquirer resulted in a .44 percent rate of increase in merchant acceptance per quarter. 
Importantly, we observe that by instrumenting the merchant discount fee with the set of 
instruments described in the previous section, we correct the (typically downward) bias in the fee 
coefficient since the coefficient estimate when the merchant discount variable is not 
instrumented is -0.031.  
While we are unable to isolate a price effect for consumer adoption debit card services, we 
find strong evidence to support our hypothesis that consumers value greater merchant acceptance 
and react to increases in the price of the main alternative payment instrument—cash. 
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the rate of merchant adoption per quarter resulted in a 4.4 
percent increase in the quarterly adoption rate of debit cards by consumers. As population 
density increases, consumer adoption of debit cards increases. Specifically, a 10 percent increase 
in population density resulted in a .139 percent increase in the quarterly growth rate of debit card 
adoption.  
As mentioned before, the underlying dynamics of credit card adoption are significantly 
different from debit card adoption because credit cards are stand-alone products. Reductions in 
credit card interchange fees increased merchant acceptance of credit cards (see table 4). 
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the rate of decline of the average interchange fee increased 
the growth rate of merchant acceptance of credit cards by 1.4 percent. As for the number of 
credit cards in the network, a 10 percent quarterly growth rate in this variable resulted in a 1.7 
percent quarterly growth in the acceptance of credit cards by merchants.  
As our priors suggested, the number of cards issued is positively impacted by the number 
of merchants that accept credit cards (table 4, column 3). Specifically, a 10 percent increase in 
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the quarterly growth rate in merchant acceptance increases the quarterly growth of credit card 
issuance by 2.8 percent.  
A key result is that growth in the number of cards issued is not affected by increases in 
the annual fee. We are unable to disentangle two potential reasons for this insignificance. First, 
existing consumers may be fairly inelastic to increases to credit card annual fees and not give up 
their credit cards. Second, they are willing to pay higher fees if more merchants accept credit 
cards. Regardless of why consumers do not respond to increases in annual fees, there may be 
benefits to more credit card accepting merchants resulting in greater consumer adoption. These 
benefits stem from the network externality of merchant acceptance. In any case, consumers that 
previously did not have credit cards have adopted them suggesting that the benefits of having a 
credit card has increased despite the increase in the annual fee. 
The fact that consumers do not react to prices may appear a bit surprising. Following the 
hypothesis that consumers may be willing to pay higher prices as merchant acceptance increases, 
we run separate yearly OLS regressions of this equation from 1997 to 2007. We find that the 
yearly estimated coefficient of prices decreased over time, suggesting that price sensitivity (in 
absolute terms) decreases as merchant acceptance increases. The coefficient of credit card annual 
fees changed from 1997 to 2007 as follows: -0.83, -0.82, -0.73, -0.72, -0.64, -0.59, -0.58, -0.55, -
0.53, -0.54, -0.51. None of the coefficients were statistically significant.13 
 The impact of lower interchange fees on merchant acceptance is positive for both debit 
and credit cards. Merchants increase acceptance when their fees fall. The impact of lower 
                                                 
13
 Even considering these empirical tests, the fact that consumers do not react to prices is a 
puzzling one. Although is not the main purpose of our analysis, it is an interesting avenue of 
future research.   
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interchange fees on debit card consumer adoption is less clear for two reasons. First, debit cards 
also serve as ATM cards and isolating their debit functionality is difficult. Second, debit card 
services are bundled with other transaction services as such identification of direct debit card 
fees is difficult. 
 
Debit and Credit Card Transaction Volumes 
 Now, we turn to payment card transaction volume. First, let’s consider the impact of 
interchange fee regulation on merchant debit card transactional volume from looking at acquirer 
transactional volume per POS terminal as the dependent variable (table 5, column 2). The 
interaction of merchant acceptance at an acquirer and the total number of cards—showing 
network effects—is significant and positive suggesting that the rate of growth of debit card 
transactions has increased because there are more merchants and consumers on board. 
Specifically, a 10 percent quarterly growth rate in this interaction resulted in a debit card 
transaction quarterly growth rate of .27 percent. Additionally, a 10 percent increase in the 
quarterly growth rate of rival ATM density—which proxies for the cost of cash withdrawal—
resulted in a .26 percent increase in the quarterly growth rate of debit card transactions at POS 
terminals. 
The increase in issuer transactions proxies for the increase in consumer usage. The key 
explanatory variable is the interaction of merchant acceptance and cards issued by the issuer. The 
interaction term is significant and positive suggesting that increases in consumer and merchant 
adoption growth rates lead to a higher rate of growth for consumer transactions (table 5, column 
3). Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the quarterly rate of growth of the interaction of network 
merchant acceptance and debit cards issued by an issuer resulted in a .49 percent quarterly 
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growth rate in an issuer’s debit card transactions per card. Furthermore, a 10 percent increase in 
the quarterly growth of rival ATM density resulted in a .60 percent increase in the quarterly 
growth rate of issuer debit card transactions per card. In other words, an increase in cash 
acquisition costs strongly encourages usage of debit cards.  
We report credit card acquirer and issuer transaction volume regressions in table 6. A 10 
percent increase in the quarterly growth of the interaction term of acceptance by merchants using 
the same acquirer and total credit cards in circulation results in a 2.06 percent increase in the 
growth of acquirer transactions at the point of sale (table 6, column2). Interestingly, the crime 
rate is also positive and statistically significant. One cautious interpretation would be that credit 
cards unlike debit cards are used for large purchases and merchants are more willing to accept 
them because carrying large amounts of cash is undesirable in high crime areas.  
We report the issuer transaction volume in table 6, column 3. We find that a 10 percent 
increase in the quarterly growth rate of the interaction term of merchant acceptance in the 
network and credit cards issued by an issuer results in a 1.70 percent increase in issuer 
transaction volume. The coefficient on the crime rate is also significant and positive suggesting 
that higher crime rates induce shift from cash to credit cards, which are generally used for 
higher-value purchases.  
 
Issuer and acquirer revenues 
 In table 7, we report our results for issuer and acquirer revenues. In the second and third 
columns, we report debit card acquiring revenue and debit card issuing revenue regression 
results, respectively. In the fourth and fifth columns, we report credit card acquiring and credit 
card issuing revenue regression results, respectively. In both sets of regressions, the increase in 
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the quarterly growth of number of transactions is positively correlated with the quarterly growth 
of bank revenues suggesting that while per-transaction revenue may have decreased, overall 
revenues increased because the revenue from increased transactions volume offset the decrease 
in per-transaction revenue for the time period of our sample. This evidence also seems to be 
supported by descriptive data, as shown in Figure 2, where transaction volume increased in 
parallel to revenues. This result is consistent with the fact that the acquiring side of the business 
may be more competitive and any reductions in interchange fees would result in an equal 
magnitude decrease in the merchant discount. We reported earlier that the correlation between 
the movements in merchant discounts and the interchange fees are close to one. On the issuing 
side, the quarterly rate of decrease in interchange fees is positively and significantly related to 
the quarterly rate of bank revenues.    
 
6.  Conclusion 
The structure of fees in two-sided markets has been addressed in the theoretical literature 
but there has been little empirical analysis regarding the impact of changes to fee structures. 
Theory predicts that platforms in two-sided markets may subsidize the participation of one type 
of end-user by extracting surplus from another type of end-user to internalize indirect network 
externalities. We find evidence that reducing interchange fees may have a positive effect on 
consumer and merchant adoption and usage when merchant adoption is far from complete.  
We also find that bank revenues increased following interchange fee reductions because 
the increase in the number of transactions appears to offset the decrease in the per-transaction 
revenue. However, there is most likely a critical interchange fee below which revenues no longer 
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increase. Unfortunately, given our data limitations, we are unable to quantify the critical 
interchange fee.  
We acknowledge that payment card networks may lower interchange fees to increase 
merchant acceptance. For example, in the United States, interchange fees for new entrants such 
as grocery stores in the 1990s were reduced significantly by payment card networks to encourage 
merchant acceptance of payment cards. Such market-based strategies also internalize the 
merchant adoption externality. Once merchant and consumer adoption is complete, interchange 
fee regulation may only result in redistribution of surplus among participants, most notably 
between banks and merchants. In this case, we are agnostic about the distribution of surplus 
among payment card market participants.  
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APPENDIX. Robustness tests 
 We conduct several robustness tests to consider alternate explanations for increased 
adoption and usage of payment cards. 
 
Other Empirical Specifications 
 We have tried other specifications for the simultaneous equations estimations. In 
particular, we estimated the system using two-stage-least squares, three-stage least squares and 
seemingly-unrelated regressions. Although the results were overall qualitatively similar, the 
goodness of fit of these estimations was far poorer than our GMM estimations.   
 In the GMM baseline results, autocorrelation tests are included to examine the possibility 
that lagged values of the dependent variables might affect, at least partially, the current values of 
these variables. In this case, a “dynamic” specification with lagged dependent variables as 
regressors could address these feedback effects. However, the values of these tests in all our 
regressions suggest that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected and, 
therefore, do not warrant using dynamic specification. In any event, regressions using dynamic 
panel techniques were also undertaken and the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
were not found to be significant in any of the equations.  
 Additionally, our results suggest that consumers and merchants benefit from reductions in 
interchange fees during our sample period because an increase in merchant card acceptance 
results in greater adoption and usage of payment cards. This result is dependent on relatively low 
adoption of payment cards as a starting point. Rochet and Tirole (2006a) suggest a couple of 
reasons why merchants may choose to accept cards even if they are made worse off by doing so. 
They argue that merchants may accept cards as a strategic tool to steal customers from their 
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competitors. Second, their acceptance decision is based on the average consumer benefit and not 
the marginal benefit. While we are unable to test whether cards are being used too much, we do 
find that lowering fees does increase usage in a market where card usage is relatively low 
compared to other countries in the region as noted above. In any event, we run year-by-year OLS 
regressions on the impact of merchant acceptance on consumer adoption and we find the 
coefficient (.44 in Table 4, column 3) remain relatively stable over the period (between .42 and 
.48). It would be interesting to analyze these relationships in more mature markets where 
adoption is close to complete and consumer choice at the point of sale determines usage. 
 
Estimations for different sub-periods 
 A simpler (although less informative) approach to likely changes in merchants’ and 
consumers’ adoption and usage of debit and credit cards is to estimate our main equations for 
four different time periods (1997-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007). The effects of 
changes in interchange fees on merchant adoption and of merchant acceptance in the network on 
the number of debit cards are from 1 to 3 times higher in the 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 periods 
than in the other two periods. These results are summarized in the table A1. These differences 
are statistically significant according to Wald tests of differences in the estimated coefficients 
and suggest that the dynamics of prices and adoption and usage particularly increased in the 
periods where interchange fees were reduced to a larger extent due to government interventions. 
In the case of credit cards, related differences in the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
abovementioned sub-periods are a bit lower (from 1 to 1.5 times higher) although also 
statistically significant according to Wald tests (not shown). 
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Alternative control variables 
 The results also seemed robust to alternative specifications of the control variables and, in 
particular, the time trend. A potential weakness of the proposed specification is that the trend is 
not appropriately capturing over time changes that may overlap with the identified impact of 
regulatory dummies. In particular, factors such as non-linear trends, business cycle influences or 
technological changes may affect our results. In order to control for these potential influences, 
we also tried other types of variables to pick them up such as a quadratic time trend, and Internet 
penetration. It may also be the case that the dynamics of adoption and usage may be different in 
territories with different levels due to idiosyncratic features such as differences in the presence of 
tourists that may make adoption and usage potentially heterogeneous across regions, thereby 
affecting to a larger extent those banks, merchants and consumers in more touristic regions. We 
have considered these influences by estimating our main equations for two sub-samples 
separating regions over the median value of tourism revenues over GDP and below that median 
value. The results for all these alternative specifications (not shown but available upon request) 
suggest that none of these alternative specifications significantly change our baseline results and 
conclusions since our main variables exhibit the same signs and similar coefficient magnitudes.  
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Table A1. Consumers and Merchants Adoption (debit and credit cards) over four different 
time periods. Simultaneous Equation estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Only the main coefficients are shown for simplicity) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
Merchant adoption 
(debit cards) 
Consumer 
adoption 
(debit cards) 
 Merchant 
adoption 
(credit 
cards) 
Consumer 
adoption 
(credit cards) 
1997-1998 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
acquirer(MACCDit) 
Number of 
debit cards 
by issuer 
(DCARDSit) 
1997-1998 
Merchant 
acceptance 
by acquirer 
(MACCCit) 
Number of 
credit cards 
by issuer 
(CCARDSit) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCDNt-1) 
- 
0.7213** 
(0.043) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCCNt-1) 
- 
0.1953** 
(0.072) 
Debit card 
interchange fee 
(DIFEEDit) 
-0.0217* 
(0.018) 
- 
Credit card 
interchange fee 
(CIFEEDit) 
-0.0633** 
(0.043) 
 
      
1999-2001 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
acquirer(MACCDit) 
Number of 
debit cards 
by issuer 
1999-2001 
Merchant 
acceptance 
by acquirer 
Number of 
credit cards 
by issuer 
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(DCARDSit) (MACCCit) (CCARDSit) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCDNt-1) 
- 
0.2736* 
(0.039) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCCNt-1) 
- 
0.3107** 
(0.066) 
Debit card 
interchange fee 
(DIFEEDit) 
-0.0614** 
(0.020) 
- 
Credit card 
interchange fee 
(CIFEEDit) 
-0.1788** 
(0.064) 
 
      
2002-2004 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
acquirer(MACCDit) 
Number of 
debit cards 
by issuer 
(DCARDSit) 
2002-2004 
Merchant 
acceptance 
by acquirer 
(MACCCit) 
Number of 
credit cards 
by issuer 
(CCARDSit) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCDNt-1) 
- 
0.2007** 
(0.055) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCCNt-1) 
- 
0.2046* 
(0.053) 
Debit card 
interchange fee 
(DIFEEDit) 
-0.0179** 
(0.017) 
- 
Credit card 
interchange fee 
(CIFEEDit) 
-0.0913* 
(0.038) 
 
      
2005-2007 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
Number of 
debit cards 
2005-2007 
Merchant 
acceptance 
Number of 
credit cards 
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acquirer(MACCDit) by issuer 
(DCARDSit) 
by acquirer 
(MACCCit) 
by issuer 
(CCARDSit) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCDNt-1) 
- 
0.5603** 
(0.050) 
Merchant 
acceptance in the 
network 
(MACCCNt-1) 
- 
0.3219** 
(0.068) 
Debit card 
interchange fee 
(DIFEEDit) 
-0.0681** 
(0.024) 
- 
Credit card 
interchange fee 
(CIFEEDit) 
-0.1892** 
(0.066) 
 
 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SCOPE 
MACCDit : Debit card merchant 
acceptance by acquirer  
Computed as (branch-weighted) average of the percentage of 
merchants accepting debit cards for purchase transactions in the 
regions where the bank operates over the total number of merchants 
in those regions. 
Bank-level 
MACCCit : Credit card merchant 
acceptance by acquirer  
Computed as (branch-weighted) average of the percentage of 
merchants accepting credit cards for purchase transactions in the 
regions where the bank operates over the total number of merchants 
in those regions. 
Bank-level 
MACCDNt : Debit card 
merchant acceptance in the 
network 
The percentage of merchants accepting debit cards where the 
network operates. 
Network-
level 
MACCCNt : Credit card 
merchant acceptance in the 
network  
The percentage of merchants accepting credit cards where the 
network operates. 
Network-
level 
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MFEEDit: Merchant debit card 
discount fee  
Average (transaction-weighted) debit card merchant discount fee 
charged by the bank computed as the (transaction-weighted) 
average discount fee charged to the merchants accepting the bank 
POS device.  
Bank-level 
MFEECit: Merchant credit card 
discount fee  
Average (transaction-weighted) credit card merchant discount fee 
charged by the bank computed as the (transaction-weighted) 
average discount fee charged to the merchants accepting the bank 
POS device.  
Bank-level 
DIFEEDit: Merchant debit card 
interchange fee  
Average (transaction-weighted) debit card interchange fee paid by 
the bank computed as the (transaction-weighted) average 
interchange fee paid by the bank.  
Bank-level 
CIFEECit: Merchant credit card 
interchange fee  
Average (transaction-weighted) interchange fee paid by the bank 
computed as the (transaction-weighted) average interchange fee 
paid by the bank.  
Bank-level 
DCARDSit: Number of debit 
cards by issuer  
Total number of debit cards issued by a bank.  Bank-level 
CCARDSit: Number of credit 
cards by issuer 
Total number of credit cards issued by a bank.  Bank-level 
DCARDSNt: Number of debit 
cards in the network 
Total number of debit cards issued by the network.  Network-
level 
CCARDSNt : Number of credit 
cards in the network 
Total number of credit cards issued by the network.  Network 
level 
DEBPOSTRit: Debit card Debit card transactions per POS terminal by an acquirer. Bank-level 
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transactions at the POS 
CREDPOSTRit: Credit card 
transactions at the POS 
Credit card transactions per POS terminal by an acquirer. Bank-level 
DEBISSit : Debit card 
transactions (issuer perspective) 
Debit card transactions per card by issuer. Bank-level 
CREDISSit : Credit card 
transactions (issuer perspective)  
Credit card transactions (month-end/no interest) per card by issuer. Bank-level 
POPDSit : Population density Number of inhabitants per km2 in the regions where the bank 
operates. 
Bank level 
RATMDit : Rival ATM density Number of an issuer’s rival bank ATMs per km2 in the regions 
where the bank operates.  
Bank-level 
AFEECREDit : Annual credit 
card fee 
Average (asset-weighted) annual credit card fee changed by the 
bank.  
Bank-level 
BSIZEit : Bank size  Log (bank assets) Bank-level 
CRIMEit: Crime rate The (asset-weighted) ratio of robbery & assaults per 1000 
inhabitants in the regions where the acquirer or issuer operates.  
Bank-level 
GDPt: GDP growth Computed as (branch-weighted) average quarterly real GDP growth 
in the regions where the bank operates. 
Bank-level 
BANKDACRit: Bank (debit 
card) acquiring revenues 
Acquirer income from debit card merchant discount fees 
Bank-level 
BANKDISRit: Bank (debit card) 
issuing revenues 
Issuer income from debit card interchange fees 
Bank-level 
BANKCACRit: Bank (credit Acquirer income from credit card merchant discount fees Bank-level 
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card) acquiring revenues 
BANKCISRit : Bank (credit 
card) issuing revenues  
Issuer income from credit card interchange fees and credit card 
annual fees 
Bank-level 
 
SOURCES: All variables related to card payments have been provided by a payment network of 45 
Spanish banks. The crime rate variables have been obtained from the Spain’s Statistical Office (INE). 
EXPLANATORY NOTES: 
- All monetary magnitudes are expressed in real terms. 
- All variables (except for regulatory dummies) are in logarithms 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Debit card merchant acceptance by acquirer in 
regions where it has branches (MACCDit) 
(percent) 
55.36 2.16 51.15 59.36 
Credit card merchant acceptance by acquirer 
in regions where it has branches (MACCCit) 
(percent) 
57.23 1.97 52.12 61.06 
Debit card merchant acceptance in the 
network (MACCDNt)  (percent) 
58.02 2.02 53.60 61.94 
Credit card merchant acceptance in the 
network (MACCCNt)  (percent) 
59.37 1.92 53.51 62.49 
Merchant debit card discount fee by acquirer 
(MFEEDit)   (percent) 
1.36 1.18 0.36 3.18 
Merchant credit card discount fee by acquirer 
(MFEECit)   (percent) 
2.03 1.93 1.06 3.56 
Merchant debit card interchange fee by 
acquirer (DIFEEDit)   (percent) 
1.24 1.13 0.31 2.93 
Merchant credit card interchange fee by 
acquirer (CIFEECit)  (percent) 
1.96 1.85 1.01 3.27 
Number of debit cards by issuer (DCARDSit) 
(millions) 
0.48 0.72 0.02 4.2 
Number of credit cards by issuer (CCARDSit) 0.55 0.94 0.01 4.9 
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(millions) 
Number of debit cards in the network 
(DCARDSNt) (millions) 
16 5.8 12 21 
Number of credit cards in the network 
(CCARDSNt) (millions) 
20 6.3 10 32 
Debit card transactions at the POS by acquirer 
(DEBPOSTRit) (millions) 
11.14 34.18 0.11 88.1 
Credit card transactions at the POS by acquirer 
(CREDPOSTRit) (millions) 
12.28 56.26 0.09 94.7 
Debit card transactions by issuer (DEBISSit) 
(percent) 
1.21 4.16 0.04 10.27 
Credit card transactions by issuer (CREDISSit) 
(percent) 
1.60 5.21 0.02 12.56 
Population density (BRDSit) (Population/km2) 84.3 13.5 61.1 98.7 
Rival ATM density by issuer (RATMDit) 
(ATMs/km2) 
0.9 0.4 0.3 1.5 
Annual credit card fee by issuer 
(AFEECREDit) (euros) 
15 10 3 35 
Bank size (BSIZEit) ( log (€mill.) 8.3 2.19 5.15 12.30 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 0.37 0.21 0.10 0.68 
GDP growth (GDPit) 0.51 0.43 0.23 1.28 
Bank (debit card) acquiring revenues 
(BANKDACR)  
4.31 2.19 0.08 45.23 
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(€ millions) 
Bank (debit card) issuing revenues 
(BANKDISR) (€ millions) 
25.43 13.84 0.32 114.15 
Bank (credit card) acquiring revenues 
(BANKCACR)  
(€ millions) 
6.17 3.12 0.11 54.89 
Bank (credit card) issuing revenues 
(BANKCISR) (€ millions) 
28.06 14.16 0.23 131.12 
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Table 3: Consumers and Merchants Adoption (debit cards) 
Simultaneous Equation estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
Merchant adoption 
(debit cards) 
Consumer 
adoption (debit 
cards) 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
acquirer(MACCDit) 
Number of debit 
cards by issuer 
(DCARDSit) 
Constant 
0.21E-11 
(0.001) 
0.17E-12 
(0.001) 
Merchant acceptance in 
the network (MACCDNt-
1) 
- 
0.4418** 
(0.052) 
Debit card interchange 
fee (DIFEEDit) 
-0.0436** 
(0.022) 
- 
Number of debit cards in 
the network (DCARDSNt) 
0.0021** 
(0.003) 
- 
Population density 
(POPDSit) 
- 
0.0139** 
(0.007) 
Bank size (BSIZEit) 
0.0087 
(0.011) 
0.0065** 
(0.012) 
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Crime rate (CRIMEit) 
-0.0216 
(0.194) 
-0.0120 
(0.162) 
GDP growth (GDPit) 
0.0249* 
(0.007) 
0.0253** 
(0.005) 
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.78 
Number of observations 1354 1354 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Regulation dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Sargan test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
(p-value in parentheses) 
76.88 
(0.005) 
AR(1) (p-value in 
parentheses) 
-0.1263 
(0.831) 
AR(2) (p-value in 
parentheses) 
−1.270 
(0.379) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 4: Consumers and Merchants Adoption (credit cards) 
Simultaneous Equation Estimation (GMM with fixed effects) 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
Merchant 
adoption (credit 
cards) 
Consumer adoption 
(credit cards) 
Merchant 
acceptance by 
acquirer 
(MACCCit) 
Number of credit 
cards by issuer 
(CCARDSit) 
Constant 
-0.22E-06 
(0.001) 
0.24E-06 
(0.001) 
Merchant acceptance in the 
network (MACCCNt-1) 
- 
0.2805** 
(0.063) 
Credit card interchange fee 
(CIFEEDit) 
-0.1395** 
(0.061) 
 
Number of credit cards in the 
network (CCARDSNt) 
0.1684** 
(0.042) 
- 
Annual credit card fee 
(AFEECREDit) 
- 
-0.6016 
(0.376) 
Bank size (BSIZEit) 
0.0048* 
(0.004) 
-0.0018 
(0.003) 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 0.0622* 0.0712** 
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(0.059) (0.055) 
GDP growth (GDPit) 
0.0291** 
(0.002) 
0.0149** 
(0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.92 
Number of observations 1354 1354 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Regulation dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
(p-value in parentheses) 
151.26 
(0.001) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses) 
-1.230 
(0.306) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses) 
−1.697 
(0.115) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 5: Debit Card Transaction Volume for Consumers and Merchants. Each equation 
estimated by 3SLS with fixed effects 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
Acquirer 
transaction 
volume (debit 
cards) 
Issuer 
transaction 
volume (debit 
cards) 
Debit card 
transactions 
per  POS 
terminal 
(DEBPOSTRit) 
Debit card 
transactions 
per card 
(issuer 
perspective) 
(DEBISSit) 
Constant 
0.05E-13 
(0.001) 
-0.07E-10 
(0.001) 
Merchant acceptance by acquirer 
(MACCDit-1)X Number of debit cards in 
the network (DCARDSNt) 
0.0273** 
(0.010) 
- 
Merchant acceptance in the network 
(MACCDNt-1)X Number of debit cards by 
issuer (DCARDSit) 
- 
0.0494** 
(0.016) 
Rival ATM density (RATMDit) 0.0255* 0.0601* 
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(0,014) (0.023) 
Bank size (BSIZEit) 
0.0321* 
(0.016) 
0.0243* 
(0.014) 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 
0.1349 
(0.144) 
0.1190 
(0.113) 
GDP growth (GDPit) 
0.0263** 
(0.004) 
0.0239** 
(0.006) 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.85 
Number of observations 1354 1354 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Regulation dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
(p-value in parentheses) 
140.43 
(0.001) 
163.26 
(0.001) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses) 
−1.628 
(0.147) 
−1.508 
(0.164) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses) 
−1.446 
(0.161) 
−1.432 
(0.193) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 6: Credit Card Transaction Volume for Consumers and Merchants 
Each equation estimated by 3SLS with fixed effects 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 
Acquirer 
transaction 
volume (credit 
cards) 
Issuer 
transaction 
volume (credit 
cards) 
Credit card 
transactions per 
POS terminal 
(CREDPOSTRit) 
Credit card 
transactions per 
card (issuer 
perspective) 
(CREDISSit) 
Constant 
0.13E-07 
(0.001) 
-0.14E-06 
(0.001) 
Merchant acceptance by acquirer(MACCCit-
1)X Number of credit cards in the network 
(CCARDSTNt) 
0.2063** 
(0.066) 
- 
Merchant acceptance in the network 
(MACCCNt-1)X Number of credit cards by 
issuer (CCARDSit) 
- 
0.1699** 
(0.064) 
Bank size (BSIZEit) 
-0.0746 
(0.188) 
0.0642* 
(0.021) 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 0.0916* 0.0508* 
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(0.039) (0.030) 
GDP growth (GDPit) 
0.0315** 
(0.014) 
0.0277** 
(0.013) 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.89 
Number of observations 1354 1354 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Regulation dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
(p-value in parentheses) 
187.3 
(0.01) 
107.19 
(0.01) 
AR(1) (p-value in parentheses) 
−0.6418 
(0.461) 
−0.8412 
(0.329) 
AR(2) (p-value in parentheses) 
−1.153 
(0.184) 
−0.931 
(0.152) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Table 7: Impact on Bank Issuing and Acquiring Revenues  
Each equation estimated by 3SLS with fixed effects 
(Clustered standard errors by bank in parentheses) 
 Bank (debit 
card) 
acquiring 
revenues 
(BANKDACR) 
Bank (debit 
card) issuing 
revenues 
(BANKDISR) 
Bank (credit 
card) 
acquiring 
revenues 
(BANKCACR) 
Bank (credit 
card) issuing 
revenues 
(BANKCISR) 
Constant 0.10E-07* 
(0.001) 
0.09E-10* 
(0.001) 
0.08E-08* 
(0.001) 
0.08E-09 
(0.001) 
Merchant acceptance by 
acquirer (MACCDit-1) X 
Number of debit cards in the 
network (DCARDSNt) 
0.0460* 
(0.012) 
- - - 
Number of debit cards by 
issuer (DCARDSit) X 
Merchant acceptance in the 
network (MACCDNt-1) 
- 0.1405** 
(0.016) 
- - 
Merchant acceptance by - - 0.0683** - 
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acquirer (MACCCit-1) X 
Number of credit cards in 
the network (CCARDSNt) 
(0.007) 
Number of credit cards by 
issuer (CCARDSit) X 
Merchant acceptance in the 
network (MACCDNt-1) 
- - - 0.1706** 
(0.013) 
Rival ATM density 
(RATMDit) 
0.0029 
(0.006) 
0.0053 
(0.031) 
- - 
Bank size (BSIZEit) 0.0646** 
(0.047) 
0.1207** 
(0.059) 
0.1806** 
(0.014) 
0.0753** 
(0.016) 
Crime rate (CRIMEit) 0.0319 
(0.073) 
0.0222 
(0.064) 
0.0197 
(0.035) 
0.0312 
(0.025) 
GDP growth (GDPit) 0.0223** 
(0.006) 
0.0209** 
(0.004) 
0.0193** 
(0.005) 
0.0214** 
(0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.89 0.71 0.94 
Number of observations 1354 1354 1354 1354 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions  
(p-value in parentheses) 
218.12  
(0.001) 
231.15  
(0.001) 
165.23  
(0.001) 
191.01  
(0.001) 
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AR(1) (p-value in 
parentheses) 
−0.6102 
(0.544) 
−0.8102 
(0.419) 
−0.8004 
(0.331) 
−0.7025 
(0.535) 
AR(2) (p-value in 
parentheses) 
−0.7035 
(0.503) 
−0.7530 
(0.426) 
−0.8243 
(0.326) 
−0.8413 
(0.323) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level 
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Figure 1: Adoption, transaction volumes, fees and regulatory events 
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Note: Rxx: regulatory event and year (xx). 
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R99 R02 R03 R05 
Figure 2: Acquirer and issuer revenues and transactions (1997-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Rxx: regulatory event and year (xx). 
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